St. John's Law Review
Volume 95, 2021, Number 1

Article 3

Confidential Settlements for Professional Malpractice
Sande L. Buhai

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENTS FOR
PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE
SANDE L. BUHAI†
INTRODUCTION
A lawyer representing a plaintiff in a professional
malpractice case advises her client not to file a complaint with
the state regulatory body—the state bar, the medical board, or
some other pertinent body—until later. The lawyer explains that
she can offer to settle the case more favorably, more quickly, and
at lower cost if they promise that, as part of the settlement,
defendant’s malfeasance will never be reported to the state
regulatory body responsible for ensuring professional competence
in the area. This tactic may allow the client to negotiate a larger
settlement because the defendant should be willing to pay more
to avoid having to defend himself in an administrative, criminal,
or disciplinary proceeding. Although the lawyer’s present client
may benefit, failing to report professional malfeasance may hurt
both future clients and the public at large.
Professional
regulatory agencies exist to protect the public from substandard
professional services. Advising a client to withhold relevant
information from such agencies for personal gain—both the
client’s and the lawyer’s—raises serious public policy issues. The
dangers of confidentiality provisions have been explored in other
contexts, particularly in products liability1 and sexual

†
Sande L. Buhai is a Clinical Professor of Law at Loyola Law School. The
author would like to thank Loyola Law School for their support of scholarship. She
would also like to thank Professor Ted Seto for his amazing editing and
encouragement.
1
See, e.g., Myron Levin, GM’s Exploding Pickup Problem, MOTHER JONES (Apr.
6,
2010),
https://www.motherjones.com/environment/2010/04/gm-ck-explodingpickup/ [https://perma.cc/R88U-AXX4]; Rebecca Hersher, Settlement Deal Reached in
2014 West Virginia Chemical Spill, NPR (Oct. 26, 2016, 3:04 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/10/26/499307717/settlement-dealreached-in-2014-west-virginia-chemical-spill [https://perma.cc/M5SE-YY4N].
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harassment cases.2 This Article explores similar problems in the
context of professional malpractice. Much of the discussion here
will focus on legal malpractice; however, similar concerns and
arguments apply to other professionals as well.
The American Bar Association (“ABA”) Model Rules do not
prohibit parties from agreeing not to report professional
misconduct to a state bar or other regulatory agency. In the
absence of a provision prohibiting such conduct, lawyers are free
to leverage the possibility of promising to refrain from such
reporting to gain their clients—and themselves—more money.
This frustrates the purposes of the Model Rules and of
professional regulation more generally. Attorneys guilty of
professional malfeasance face no reprimand from the state bar
for their misconduct. Indeed, an attorney who has repeatedly
violated the Model Rules may nevertheless be able to maintain a
pristine record. And potential clients who consult state bar
records may, as a result, end up being misled—by the bar itself—
regarding the malfeasance history of the lawyers they are
considering retaining. Even the ABA acknowledges that
confidentiality in professional malpractice settlement agreements
“prevent[s] regulators and government agencies from performing
their duty to enforce the law and protect the public.”3
In the case of legal malpractice, California prohibits such
conduct. California Rules of Professional Conduct (“CRPC”)
5.6(b) states: “A lawyer shall not participate in offering or
making an agreement which precludes the reporting of a
violation of these rules.”4 When adopting CRPC 5.6(b), California
recognized that the Model Rules did not contain any such
provision, but “carried [the provision] forward because it provides
important public protection.”5 The California rules also prohibit
threatening to report professional misconduct more broadly to
gain an advantage in civil settlements. CRPC 3.10(a) states: “A

2

See, e.g., Ann Fromholz & Jeanette Laba, #MeToo Challenges Confidentiality
and Nondisclosure Agreements, L.A. LAW., May 2018, at 12.
3
Ronald L. Burdge, Confidentiality in Settlement Agreements Is Bad for Clients,
Bad
for
Lawyers,
Bad
for
Justice,
GPSOLO
(Nov.
1,
2012),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/gpsolo/publications/gp_solo/2012/november_dec
ember2012privacyandconfidentiality/confidentiality_settlement_agreements_is_bad_
clients_lawyers_justice/ [https://perma.cc/52YK-U7LH].
4
CAL. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.6(b) (2020).
5
CAL. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.6 exec. summary (Proposed Draft 2017),
https://www.calbar.ca.gov/portals/0/documents/rules/rrc2014/final_rules/rrc2-5.6_[1500]-all.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ETN-6JRN].
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lawyer shall not threaten to present criminal, administrative, or
disciplinary charges to obtain an advantage in a civil dispute.”6
This Article argues that the ABA should adopt rules similar
to CRPC 5.6(b) and CRPC 3.10(a) to prohibit: (1) threatening to
report professional misconduct to gain an advantage in civil
settlements; and (2) agreeing to not report professional
misconduct to the relevant professional regulatory body as part
of such settlements. This Article does not argue that confidential
settlements should be eliminated in all circumstances—for
example, in the settlement of certain kinds of employment
disputes. The prohibitions for which this Article does argue are
specific: that lawyers should be prohibited from threatening to
report professional misconduct to gain an advantage in a civil
dispute and that they should also be prohibited from agreeing to
forego reporting professional misconduct to the relevant
professional regulatory body in a settlement agreement.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I highlights the
widespread dangers that arise whenever a plaintiff agrees to
withhold information from the relevant professional regulatory
body. In the process, it briefly examines two other areas where
confidential settlements have been examined and criticized on
similar grounds: sexual harassment and products liability. Part
II explores how CRPC 5.6(b) prevents the societal harms that
result from confidential settlements in the legal malpractice
context, though not in other professional malpractice contexts.
Part III examines CRPC 3.10, which acts as a counterpart to
CRPC 5.6(b) and prohibits lawyers from using threats of
reporting professional misconduct to the relevant professional
regulatory body, among other threats, to gain an advantage in
the civil setting. Finally, Part IV argues that the ABA Model
Rules should adopt explicit rules that prohibit lawyers from
agreeing, on behalf of themselves or their client, not to report
professional malfeasance to the relevant professional regulatory
body and, further, that prohibit lawyers from threatening to
make such reports to gain an advantage in civil disputes.
I. THE DANGER OF CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENTS
Confidentiality clauses in settlement agreements commonly
prohibit the parties from disclosing the details of the settlement

6

CAL. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.10(a) (2020) (emphasis added).
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and any facts that led up to the settlement.7 These provisions,
also called non-disclosure agreements (“NDAs”), sometimes
create codes of silence that, if broken, lead to severe financial
penalties.8 Although such agreements can be beneficial in some
contexts—for example, in protecting trade secrets—in other
contexts the agreements can prevent the dissemination of
information that is important to preventing harm to others. For
example, users of a negligently manufactured product may
continue to buy that product, risking further harm. And victims
of sexual harassment may be silenced, giving perpetrators the
freedom to continue a career of abusive behavior. Under these
agreements, any legitimate criminal and disciplinary charges
escape publicity and are sealed away in these confidential
settlements.9 The relevant malefactors face no public reprimand
for their behaviors and may therefore continue to engage in
conduct harmful to others.10
Confidential settlements also prevent litigants from
obtaining valuable information regarding previously settled
disputes. In civil cases, this creates an “inefficiency of allowing
disputants to keep confidential information that might otherwise
assist future parties.”11 For example, the confidential settlement
of a products liability case is likely to result in duplicative efforts
to prove the harmful nature of the product in question, making
litigation far more expensive for both plaintiffs and the legal
system as a whole.12 Prohibiting disclosure of information
regarding previously settled cases often results in future litigants
having to go through the “expense and trouble of essentially
relitigating disputes that have already been resolved.”13
A.

Settlements in Sexual Harassment Lawsuits

In the context of sexual harassment, commentators have
observed that confidential settlements free perpetrators while

7

Fromholz & Laba, supra note 2.
Vasundhara Prasad, Note, If Anyone is Listening, #MeToo: Breaking the
Culture of Silence Around Sexual Abuse Through Regulating Non-Disclosure
Agreements and Secret Settlements, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2507, 2513–15 (2018).
9
See Burdge, supra note 3.
10
See id.
11
Erik S. Knutsen, Keeping Settlements Secret, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 945, 962
(2010).
12
Id.
13
Id.
8
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silencing their victims.14 Perpetrators often seek secrecy; a
promise of confidentiality from one victim allows the perpetrator
to continue to victimize others.15 The perpetrator may be
undeterred by the first lawsuit, perhaps even encouraged,
because he knows the public will never learn about his
predilections and prior acts.16 The silencing of one victim means
that “similarly situated victims will not know that they too can
bring claims against the same perpetrator.”17 One victim’s
credibility would be strengthened by testimony of similar acts by
the same alleged perpetrator.18 The silencing of victims allows
the perpetrator to divide and conquer, minimizing the possibility
of corroboration.19
The consequence of helping another victim may be breach of
contract; a prior victim who corroborates the current victim’s
story may be forced to repay any amounts she obtained in
settlement, commonly plus penalties and legal fees.20
Confidentiality agreements in sexual harassment cases create
the risk of financial catastrophe if the victim should ever feel
impelled to tell her story at a later time.21 When victims are
silenced and perpetrators are enabled to evade accountability,
victims feel isolated and powerless.22
In September 2013, Occidental College reached a
confidential settlement between the thirty-seven Occidental
students and alumni who alleged “that [Occidental College]
deliberately discouraged victims from reporting sexual assaults,
misled
students
about
their
rights
during
campus
investigations . . . and handed down minor punishment to known
assailants who in some cases allegedly struck again.”23 In
connection with the confidential settlement, Occidental “agreed
to pay the women an undisclosed sum to avoid a lawsuit.”24 As is
14

Prasad, supra note 8, at 2510.
Id. at 2515.
16
Bradford J. Kelley & Chase J. Edwards, #MeToo, Confidentiality Agreements,
and Sexual Harassment Claims, 2018 A.B.A. BUS. L. TODAY 1, 2.
17
Prasad, supra note 8, at 2515.
18
Fromholz & Laba, supra note 2, at 13.
19
Id. at 13–14.
20
Prasad, supra note 8, at 2514.
21
See Kelley & Edwards, supra note 16.
22
Prasad, supra note 8, at 2519.
23
Jason Felch & Jason Song, Occidental College Settles in Sexual Assault Cases,
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2013), https://www.latimes.com/local/la-xpm-2013-sep-18-lame-occidental-settlement-20130919-story.html.
24
Id.
15
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common with confidential settlements, the terms of Occidental’s
2013 agreement barred the victims from publicly discussing the
college’s handling of their cases.25 Most likely, at least some of
the assailants continued their inexcusable behaviors.
If
Occidental had instead taken appropriate measures to disclose
and punish the alleged assailants, they would not likely have
repeated those behaviors.
1.

The Model Rules’ Attempts to Address the Issue

The Model Rules provide little guidance to attorneys who
fear that confidentiality provisions in sexual harassment cases
may hurt the public or hinder future plaintiffs. Indeed, the duty
of zealous representation may require recommending, drafting,
and including such provisions in settlement agreements
notwithstanding attorneys’ fears.26
While some rules may
arguably apply in limited circumstances, no rule provides clear
guidance to attorneys considering confidentiality agreements in
the context of repeated sexual misconduct—even in cases that
could be prosecuted as felony offenses or cases involving
childhood sexual abuse.
There has been some debate about the applicability of MR
5.6(b) in confidential settlements.27 MR 5.6(b) provides that an
attorney cannot agree to restrict her right to practice in the
future as part of the settlement.28 According to the ABA Ethics
Committee, an attorney cannot agree to a settlement that would
prohibit him from using any information learned during the
current representation in any future representation against the
same defendant.29 The committee also stated, however, that “a
lawyer may participate in a settlement agreement that prohibits
him from revealing information relating to the representation of
his client.”30 This apparent ambivalence suggests that the
committee has not yet fully resolved the relevant issues.
The committee has had the opportunity to consider and
adopt a specific rule relevant to this question.31 Professor
25

Id.
See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
27
See Jon Bauer, Buying Witness Silence: Evidence-Suppressing Settlements and
Lawyers’ Ethics, 87 OR. L. REV. 481, 496–500, 498 n.45 (2008).
28
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.6(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
29
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 00–417 (2000).
30
Id.
31
Tammy J. Meyer & Kyle A. Lansberry, Ongoing Debate: Confidential
Settlement Agreements, 48 No. 7 DRI FOR DEF. 37 (2006).
26
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Richard A. Zitrin proposed a rule that would have restricted
lawyers’ ability to participate in the creation of confidential
agreements in, among other contexts, that of sexual predators.32
Professor Zitrin believed that attorneys felt that in participating
in the creation of confidential settlements they were “zealous[ly]
advoca[ting]” for their clients, as required by the Model Rules,
even if such provisions might be contrary to the public interest.33
He offered a solution in the form of a rule with a structure
similar to that of the client confidentiality rule.34 His proposed
rule stated:
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making an
agreement, whether in connection with a lawsuit or otherwise,
to prevent or restrict the availability to the public of
information that the lawyer reasonably believes directly
concerns a substantial danger to the public health or safety, or
the health or safety of any particular individual(s).35

The committee rejected the proposed rule, however, because
members believed that since it is legal for clients to enter into
such agreements, it must be ethical for lawyers to help clients to
do so by participating in the drafting.36 The Model Rules, to the
extent they address this issue, therefore effectively weigh in on
the side of nondisclosure.
2.

State Legislative Attempts to Address the Issue

A number of states, by contrast, have enacted legislation
limiting confidentiality in this context.37 For instance, Florida’s
Sunshine Act prohibits a court from entering an order or
judgment that intentionally or incidentally conceals a “public
hazard.”38 “Consequently, courts have interpreted the term
‘public hazard’ to mean a ‘tangible danger to public health or
safety.’ ”39
The law encompasses orders regarding sealed
32

Id.
Emily Fiftal, Respecting Litigants’ Privacy and Public Needs: Striking Middle
Ground in an Approach to Secret Settlements, 54 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 503, 531
(2003).
34
Id.; see MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2018).
35
Richard A. Zitrin Re: Comment on Rules 1.7 and 1.4, CTR. FOR PRO. RESP. (Sept.
19, 2000), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy/ethics_2
000_commission/e2k_witness_zitrin/ [https://perma.cc/KW8A-SLEU].
36
Meyer & Lansberry, supra note 31.
37
Ramit Mizrahi, Sexual Harassment Law After #MeToo: Looking to California
as a Model, 128 YALE L.J.F. 121, 140 (2018).
38
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West 2020).
39
Prasad, supra note 8, at 2532.
33

38

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:31

documents, evidence, or settlement agreements and “voids, as a
matter of public policy, any agreement, including private
settlement agreements, that hides a ‘public hazard.’ ”40
Similarly, a Texas statute creates the presumption that all court
records are public records, which includes any document filed
with the court, including settlement agreements.41 If a party
wishes to have a settlement agreement remain confidential, they
must show the need for confidentiality outweighs the public
health and safety concerns.42
California likewise prohibits settlement agreements that
prevent the disclosure of factual information related to claims
involving certain types of sexual conduct, cases that can be
prosecuted as felony offenses, and childhood sexual abuse.43 The
legislature believed that although confidentiality agreements
may help to facilitate individual claim settlements, they also put
the public at risk by allowing sexual predators to hide from law
enforcement and the public at large.44 Under California law, an
attorney who demands the inclusion of a confidentiality provision
in a settlement agreement that conceals an act that may be
prosecuted as a felony sex offense, or advises a client to sign such
an agreement, may face discipline by the State Bar of
California.45
In January 2018, a bill was submitted to the California
Legislature that would ban the accused wrongdoer in sexual
harassment cases from requiring the purported victim to remain
silent about the harassment as a condition of a settlement.46 The
proposed bill, Stand Together Against Non-Disclosures
(“STAND”) Act, would expand the current settlement prohibition
to prohibit attempts to use confidentiality agreements to conceal
alleged sexual assault, workplace harassment, or discrimination
based on sex.47 The bill protects victim privacy by allowing
victims to request confidentiality but prohibits the alleged
perpetrator from initiating the inclusion of such provisions.48
The New York State Assembly has similarly taken up a bill
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Id. at 2531.
Meyer & Lansberry, supra note 31.
Id.
CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1002(a) (West 2012).
Mizrahi, supra note 37.
Prasad, supra note 8, at 2534–35.
Id. at 2522.
Mizrahi, supra note 37, at 141.
Id.
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aimed at preventing the enforcement of clauses in employment
contracts that conceal the details of harassment or waive
procedural rights or remedies.49
B.

Settlements in Product Liability Cases

Similar problems arise in the product liability context.
Confidentiality provisions in product liability cases often have
harmful consequences to the public.50 Most obviously,
confidentiality provisions prevent the public from learning that a
product is harmful. The Johns-Manville Co. secretly settled a
case brought by employees for asbestos-related injuries.51 For
forty years, thousands of workers contracted respiratory diseases
as a result of asbestos, and for much of that period,
manufacturers denied that asbestos was dangerous52 Equally
important, failure to publicly disclose product defects
substantially reduces the incentive for manufacturers to fix their
harmful products. For example, tread separation of
Bridgestone/Firestone tires caused multiple car accidents over
the course of almost a decade, resulting in serious injuries and
fatalities.53 The manufacturer simply settled the resulting
lawsuits and continued to sell its defective tires by the millions.54
As a result, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
estimated that Firestone tires caused 203 deaths and more than
500 injuries.55 Secret settlements have allowed manufacturers to
continue to sell defective products; so long as profits from the
sales exceed the costs of settlement, such manufacturers have

49

Prasad, supra note 8, at 2521.
Brendan Faulkner & Michael A. D’Amico, Unnecessary Court Secrecy in
Product Liability Litigation Endangers Our Safety, and Undermines Fundamental
Principles of our Civil Justice System, https://www.damicopettinicchi.com/scholarlyarticles/unnecessary-court-secrecy-in-product-liability-litigation-endangers-oursafety-and-undermines-fundamental-principles-of-our-civil-justice-system.html
[https://perma.cc/F2BW-5B8P] (last visited Apr. 2, 2021).
51
Sara Thacker, Court Seeks End to Secret Settlements, REPORTERS COMM.,
https://www.rcfp.org/journals/the-news-media-and-the-law-fall-2002/court-seeksend-secret-settle/ [https://perma.cc/XEH7-SPWH] (last visited Apr. 2, 2021).
52
Id.
53
John Greenwald, Inside the Ford/Firestone Fight, TIME (May 29, 2001),
http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,128198,00.html
[https://perma.cc/DRS7-C7QN].
54
Id.
55
Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., NHTSA Press Release Firestone Recalls,
(Oct. 4, 2001), https://icsw.nhtsa.gov/nhtsa/announce/press/firestone/Update.html
[https://perma.cc/M6WR-N77L].
50
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little incentive to fix the underlying problems.56 Publicizing
those problems, by contrast, would reduce sales and profits, thus
incentivizing the manufacturers to sell safer products.
Another example of the role of confidential settlements in
perpetuating product liability problems would be that of General
Motors’ faulty ignition systems.57 Beginning in 2002, these
systems caused at least fifty-six deaths and eighty-seven
injuries.58 GM settled the resulting product liability cases with
agreements that required plaintiff and attorney confidentiality.
It was not until twelve years later, in 2014, that GM was forced
to issue a recall of models with the faulty ignition; it was only
then that “the public realized that GM had been secretly settling
wrongful death and negligence claims that arose when these
ignition switches failed.”59 If the public had learned about these
secret settlements and the dangers associated with the faulty
ignition systems early on, far fewer deaths and injuries would
have occurred.60 History demonstrates that many manufacturers
are aware of the risks associated with their products “and use[ ]
secret settlements to purposely hide those risks from the public”61
rather than fixing the underlying problems.
Unfortunately, in this context, lawyers are often complicit in
concealing product risks.62 Rather than informing the
appropriate authorities or publicly litigating cases, they use their
knowledge of the dangers of the products that have harmed their
clients to gain larger settlement payouts, which they commonly
share. Once the settlement agreement has been signed, the

56

See, e.g., Levin, supra note 1; Rebecca Hersher, Settlement Deal Reached in 2014
West
Virginia
Chemical
Spill,
NPR
(Oct.
26,
2016,
3:04
PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/10/26/499307717/settlement-deal-reachedin-2014-west-virginia-chemical-spill [https://perma.cc/PJA3-BYUP] (detailing toxic
chemical spills); Jef Feeley & Edvard Pettersson, Johnson & Johnson Unit Sued Over
Leaking
Breast
Implants,
BLOOMBERG
(Feb.
3,
2017,
5:05
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-03/johnson-johnson-unit-sued-overleaking-breast-implants (discussing leaking breast implants).
57
Mel David Zahnd, Who’s Afraid of the Light? Product Liability Cases,
Confidential Settlements, and Defense Attorneys’ Ethical Obligations, 28 GEO. J
LEGAL ETHICS 1005, 1007–09 (2015) (citing GM Recall: Sealed Settlements and
Public
Safety,
MPR
NEWS
(Mar.
18,
2014,
2:00
PM),
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2014/03/18/daily-circuit-secret-settlements-gm
[https://perma.cc/QX2C-7VVZ]).
58
Id. at 1005.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 1006.
62
See id. at 1008.

2021]

CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENTS

41

danger of the product is reconcealed, never again to see the light
of day until the next victim is injured.
Some states have begun to address the problems created by
confidential settlements in products liabilities cases. Florida has
a statute that prohibits the concealment of public hazards.63 The
Eastern District of Michigan requires that secret settlements be
unsealed after two years.64 California prohibits confidential
settlements in actions brought under its Lemon Law, regarding
defective cars.65 More recently, California legislators introduced
Assembly Bill 889 to broadly ban confidentiality in settlement
agreements involving dangerous products.66
Sexual harassment and products liability cases have an
important characteristic in common: they commonly involve
threats to the safety and well-being of parties other than the two
parties to the settlement agreement—what economists call
“externalities.”67 In such situations, we cannot rely on the
parties to the agreement to protect all relevant stakeholders.
Most importantly, we cannot rely on them to protect future
potential victims.
In the face of externalities, standard
justifications for freedom of contract collapse. Regardless of
whether confidentiality agreements in such contexts should be
legal, it is unbecoming for attorneys to recommend or participate
in their creation. The next Section argues that the same is true
of confidentiality agreements that have the effect of suppressing
reports of professional malfeasance to the relevant regulatory
authorities.

63
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West 2020) (“Any portion of an agreement or
contract which has the purpose or effect of concealing a public hazard, any
information concerning a public hazard, or any information which may be useful to
members of the public in protecting themselves from injury which may result from
the public hazard, is void, contrary to public policy, and may not be enforced.”).
64
See REAGAN ET AL., SEALED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS IN FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURT 3 (2003).
65
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.26 (West 2020) (“Any automobile manufacturer,
importer, distributor, dealer, or lienholder . . . is prohibited from . . . [i]ncluding . . . a
confidentiality clause . . . prohibiting the buyer or lessee from disclosing information
to anyone about the problems with the vehicle.”).
66
A.B. 889, 2017–2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
67
See, e.g., HENRY N. BUTLER, CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL & JOANNA
SHEPHERD, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 185 (3d ed. 2014).
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II. PROHIBITING ATTORNEYS FROM PARTICIPATING IN
AGREEMENTS TO SUPPRESS REPORTING OF PROFESSIONAL
MALFEASANCE
Of reported cases of attorney malfeasance, 46% arise from
substantive errors such as “a failure to know or apply
substantive law . . . [a] failure to know or ascertain a
deadline . . . [or i]nadequate investigation or discovery of facts”;68
28.5% arise from administrative errors such as “clerical and
delegation errors, lost file or document errors, and
procrastination,” “failure to file documents,” and “failure to
calendar”;69 12.3% arise from intentional wrongs including
“fraudulent acts by the lawyer, malicious prosecution or abuse of
process, libel or slander, [or] violations of civil rights”;70 and
12.3% arise from client-relations errors including “failure to
follow the client’s instructions,” or “failure to obtain the client’s
consent or to inform the client.”71 Such problems are commonly
systemic—substantive errors typically reflect a failure to have
mastered substantive or procedural rules; administrative errors
typically reflect poorly designed or administered office systems;
intentional wrongs are rarely limited to a single wrongful act;
and, problems in client relations commonly reflect bad habits.
Even the most seemingly innocuous errors often lead to the
dismissal of claims, leaving clients little recourse.
The most egregious acts of malfeasance often remain
unreported to the state bar, and therefore never come to the
attention of the attorney’s potential future clients because the
malefactor insists on confidentiality as a condition of settlement.
For instance,
[c]lients who become aware that their funds have been stolen
are often unwilling to report the misconduct because they are
negotiating with the lawyer to retrieve their money. A common
condition of such settlements is that the client will not report
the misconduct. The lawyer then steals from another client to
pay the settlement.72
68
Daniel E. Pinnington, The Biggest Malpractice Claim Risks, 28 GPSOLO, 18,
18–19 (2011).
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Comm’n on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enf’t, Lawyer Regulation for A New Century,
A.B.A. CTR. FOR PRO. RESP. (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/prof
essional_responsibility/resources/report_archive/mckay_report/ [https://perma.cc/WPM23Q9A].
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Just as some states have begun to prohibit the concealment
of threats to the public in the sexual harassment and product
liability contexts, so has California begun to prohibit attorney
participation in the concealment of threats to the public in the
CRPC 5.6(b), known
professional malfeasance context.73
previously as CRPC 1-500(A), now provides that: “A lawyer shall
not participate in offering or making an agreement which
precludes the reporting of a violation of these rules.”74 Although
the rule is limited to malfeasance by attorneys, not professional
malfeasance generally, it is a promising first step. Thus far,
CRPC 5.6(b) is unique to California; no other states’ legal
practice rules contain such a provision.
In adopting the quoted portion of the rule, the commission
commented that: “[a]lthough this concept is not in Model Rule
5.6, the Commission recommends that it be carried forward
because it provides important public protection.”75 The Executive
Summary of CRPC 5.6 explained that CRPC 5.6 expressly
prohibits an attorney from conditioning a civil settlement for
professional misconduct against the attorney on the client not
filing a complaint with the State Bar.76 The language of the rule
was similar to California Business & Professions Code § 6090.5,
which prohibits arrangements that seek to bar reporting
malpractice; the Executive Summary explained that CRPC 5.6
was intended to be broader “because it was not limited to
circumstances involving attorney malpractice.”77
The drafters of the 2018 CRPC also recommended adopting a
provision that would have prohibited confidential settlement
agreements in general, but the State Bar rejected it.78 Although
the State Bar acknowledged the positive values of prohibiting
confidential settlements, such as not allowing the concealment of
disclosure of dangerous evidence in a case that can “undermine
public safety,”79 the State Bar believed that such a prohibition
would be better “accomplished by statute or rule of procedure,
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[and] not a rule of professional conduct.”80 The State Bar feared
that adopting and implementing such a rule would require policy
decisions that go “beyond the scope of the Commission’s
Charter.”81
As has been noted, this Article does not argue that
confidential settlement agreements should be prohibited in
general. CRPC 5.6(b) might easily have been expanded, however,
to provide that: “A lawyer shall not participate in offering or
making an agreement which precludes the reporting of a
violation of these rules or of any other professional malfeasance
by a member of a regulated profession.” There is no obvious
reason to prohibit attorneys from concealing malfeasance by a
lawyer while allowing them to conceal malfeasance by other
regulated professionals.
III. PROHIBITING THREATS OF DISCIPLINARY REPORTING TO
OBTAIN AN ADVANTAGE IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
The flip side of agreeing not to report professional
malfeasance in a settlement agreement is to threaten to report
such malfeasance if the opposing party fails to agree to the
proposed settlement. It would be incongruous to prohibit such
threats while permitting such settlements or to prohibit such
settlements while permitting such threats. If a lawyer is
permitted to threaten disciplinary reporting if the opposing party
fails to settle—and thereby for the lawyer implicitly to promise
not to undertake such reporting if the opposing party agrees—
one would expect the same lawyer to be able to reduce her
implicit promise to a writing enforceable in court. Conversely, if
a lawyer is not permitted to threaten disciplinary reporting if the
opposing party fails to settle—and thereby for the lawyer
implicitly to promise not to undertake such reporting if the
opposing party agrees—one would expect the same lawyer to be
prohibited from reducing that same implicit promise to writing.
Unlike CRPC 5.6(b), however, which is unique to California, the
question of whether a lawyer may make threats to report
malfeasance to obtain an advantage in civil litigation has been
subject to extensive consideration by both the ABA and the
states.82
80
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Id.
82
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-363 (1992)
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Many states have adopted provisions that prohibit lawyers
from using threats to report malfeasance to obtain an advantage
in civil proceedings.83 The ABA’s old Model Codes used to contain
a similar provision, but the ABA abandoned that provision when
it adopted the Model Rules.84 This reopened the door for
attorneys and their clients to threaten disciplinary action to gain
favorable settlement offers. This, in turn, is consistent with the
ABA’s current position regarding attorney participation in
agreements to suppress the reporting of professional
malfeasance.
The relationship between threats and agreements and the
relationship between civil and other proceedings are both
complex. “Any time parties have a dispute and engage in
prelitigation negotiations, there is at least the implied ‘threat’ or
understanding that if they cannot reach an agreement or
‘settlement,’ either party may sue the other.”85 That “threat” or
understanding may well be express.
A threat to sue if
a settlement of a civil matter cannot be reached should not
provide grounds to void a settlement agreement. The ethical and
public policy considerations that prohibit threats to accuse
someone of a crime in order to induce a settlement agreement do
not apply to a threat to commence a civil suit, since the civil
system exists for the very purpose of providing a peaceful means
to resolve disputes. If a dispute cannot be resolved without filing
a lawsuit, it is to be expected—and even encouraged—that a
party would file a lawsuit rather than resort to self-help or some
extrajudicial means of dealing with it.
By contrast, a threat to report a crime unless a related civil
matter can be amicably resolved may or may not be permissible.
“If you do not make good on the check you delivered to my client,
we will have to file charges that you willfully passed a bad check”
seems reasonable. “If you do not settle my client’s negligence
claim on the terms we have set forth, we will tell the police that
you have been stealing from your employer” does not seem

83

BREM MOLDOVSKY ET AL., COMMERCIAL AND FED. LITIG. SECTION OF THE N.Y.
STATE BAR ASS’N, THREATENING DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTORNEYS IN NEW
YORK 14 (2015).
84
Id. at 13.
85
RICHARD ROSEN & LIZA M. VELAZQUEZ, SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS IN
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES: NEGOTIATING, DRAFTING & ENFORCEMENT 4–32 (2d ed.
2019).
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reasonable. Indeed, the latter may itself be criminal blackmail.
In civil suits,
[s]ettlement agreements, like other contracts, may be attacked
on the grounds that they were procured by wrongful threats or
duress. Such a settlement agreement is voidable. The party
seeking to set aside the settlement agreement must establish
(1) a threat, (2) unlawfully made, (3) which caused involuntary
acceptance of the contract terms (party was deprived of the
exercise of free will), (4) because the circumstances permitted no
alternative (resort to legal remedies or other relief not
practical).86

This creates a potentially high bar for rules of professional
responsibility seeking to regulate such threats. Is a threat to for
a lawyer to say she will report a crime unless the opposing party
takes some specified action professionally permissible unless it
constitutes criminal blackmail or duress of a sort that would
permit a party to void the contract? As will be seen, the ABA
comes dangerously close to answering this question in the
affirmative.87
A rule or interpretation that exonerates an
attorney unless the disciplinary board can be persuaded that she
has committed criminal blackmail or exerted duress of a sort that
would void a contract is unlikely to play any significant role in
the ongoing regulation of professional behavior.
It is an
abdication, not a rule.
A large part of the discussion of the foregoing issues has
been framed in terms of threats to report criminal violations.
Most of the same considerations, however, apply to threats to
report professional disciplinary violations, where the penalty is
loss of livelihood, not jail. The issue is further complicated by
ABA Model Rule 8.3, which itself requires that lawyers report
legal malpractice to “the appropriate professional authority.”88
To threaten such a report to obtain an advantage in a civil
dispute and then contractually to agree never to make such a
report as part of a personally profitable settlement agreement
impugns the integrity of the entire profession.

86

RICHARD A. ROSEN ET AL., SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS IN COMMERCIAL
DISPUTES: NEGOTIATING, DRAFTING AND ENFORCEMENT § 4.07(b) (2d ed. Supp.
2021).
87
See infra text accompanying notes 115–119.
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The Model Rules

The ABA intentionally omitted a provision that prohibits
threats to gain an advantage in civil disputes when it replaced
the Model Code with the Model Rules. In August 1969, the ABA
replaced the Canons of Professional Ethics with the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility (“Model Code”).89 The Model Code
acted as the “standard of conduct” for lawyers, employing a
“unique tripartite” system of “aspirational” Canons and Ethical
Considerations and mandatory Disciplinary Rules.90 Courts
struggled to apply the tripartite system of the Model Code
uniformly.91 Therefore, in 1983, the ABA replaced it with the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”).92 The
Model Rules were written in restatement format with the
thought that that they might thereby be more understandable,
convenient, and amenable to uniform application.93 The ABA
intended that the Model Rules accomplish the same results as
the Model Code, but through “clearer language” and “more useful
interpretive guidance.”94 The ABA did not originally recommend
any substantive changes be made to the Model Code.95
Nevertheless, not all rules in the Model Code were retained.
Most importantly for the purpose of this Article, Disciplinary
Rule (“DR”) 7-105(A) was removed, which stated, “[a] lawyer
shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to
present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil
matter.”96 The rule prohibited a lawyer from “coerc[ing] a civil
remedy by threatening criminal accusations unrelated to the civil
wrong.”97 By prohibiting such conduct, the rule prevented a
lawyer from bringing, directly or indirectly, or threatening to
bring criminal charges for the sole purpose of gaining an
advantage in a civil case.98 In essence, DR 7-105(A) prevented an
attorney from extorting either another attorney or the opposing
89

Model Code of Professional Responsibility and Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, 108 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 1214 (1983).
90
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE A.B.A. MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982-2013, at xiv (Art Garwin ed., 2013).
91
Id. at xiv–xv.
92
Id. at xvi.
93
Id. at xiv–xv.
94
Id. at xv.; George A. Kuhlman, Pennsylvania Considers the A.B.A. Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, 59 TEMP. L. Q. 419, 421 (1986).
95
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 90, at xv.
96
MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. DR 7-105(A) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
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Bruce Green, Threatening Litigation, 44 A.B.A. LITIG. J. 13, 14 (2017).
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ABA/BLAW Law. Man. On Prof. Conduct § 71:601 (ABA/BLAW 1984).
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party to obtain a settlement.99 To violate DR 7-105(A) there must
be “proof that the person charged acted with a purpose solely to
obtain an advantage in a civil matter.”100
DR 7-105(A) was enacted in part to ensure that attorneys did
not abuse the respective functions of the civil and criminal justice
systems. In considering these goals, the duty of a lawyer, and
the bounds of the law, the New York Lawyer’s Code of
Professional Responsibility explained:
The civil adjudicative process is primarily designed for the
settlement of disputes between parties, while the criminal
process is designed for the protection of society as a whole.
Threatening to use, or using, the criminal process to coerce
adjustment of private civil claims or controversies is a
subversion of that process; further, the person against whom
the criminal process is so misused may be deterred from
asserting legal rights and thus the usefulness of the civil
process in settling private disputes is impaired. As in all cases
of abuse of judicial process, the improper use of criminal process
tends to diminish public confidence in our legal system.101

DR 7-105(A) reflected the ABA’s fear that, without this rule’s
specific guidance, threats of criminal referral to prosecutorial
authorities would be used to extort settlements in civil actions.102
Prior to removing DR 7-105(A) from the Model Rules, the
Committee twice addressed the use of a threat of criminal
prosecution to gain an advantage in a civil matter.103 In 1978,
the Committee concluded that “a threat to present criminal
charges made solely to collect a civil debt violated DR 7105(A) even if the lawyer was correct in stating that the debtor
violated an applicable criminal law.”104 A few years later, in
1981, the Committee concluded that “[a] law firm, while pursuing
civil remedies on behalf of clients against persons who [were] also
violating a criminal statute, [was] not prohibited under the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility from reporting the

99

Green, supra note 97.
Decato’s Case, 379 A.2d 825, 827 (N.H. 1977).
101
N.Y. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT EC 7-21 (2007).
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Nicola M. McMillan, Recent Developments in the Ethical Treatment of Threats
of Criminal Referral in Civil Debt Collection Matters, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 935,
937 (2008).
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See id.; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Informal Op. 1427
(1978); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Informal Op. 1484 (1981).
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ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 92-363 (1992).
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violations to prosecutors” because the conduct did not involve the
use of a threat against the opposing party.”105
The ABA’s deletion of DR 7-105(A) was based on its belief
that it is not inherently harmful for a lawyer to threaten criminal
charges to obtain an advantage in civil litigation.106 The ABA
concluded that abusive threats could be handled adequately by
other parts of the Model Rules and the criminal law—specifically
the law of extortion.107 About ten years after deleting DR 7105(A), the ABA offered its reasoning: “[t]he deliberate omission
of DR 7-105(A)’s language or any counterpart from the Model
Rules rested on the drafters’ position that ‘extortionate,
fraudulent, or otherwise abusive threats were covered by other,
more general prohibitions in the Model Rules and thus that there
was no need to outlaw such threats specifically.’ ”108 The ABA
further explained, “Model Rules that both provide an explanation
of why the omitted provision DR 7-105(A) was deemed
unnecessary and set the limits on legitimate use of threats of
prosecution are Rules 8.4, 4.4, 4.1 and 3.1.”109
The purportedly constraining effects of the cited Rules in
this regard are not completely clear. Model Rule 8.4 makes clear
that any lawyer who “engage[s] in conduct involving dishonest,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation” is engaging in professional
misconduct.110 Model Rule 4.4 prevents an attorney from using
methods that “have no substantial purpose other than to
embarrass, delay, or burden a third person” or from using
“methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of
such a person.”111 Rule 4.4 also mandates that “[a] lawyer who
receives a document or electronically stored information relating
to the representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or
reasonably should know that the document or electronically
stored information was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify
the sender.”112 Rule 4.1 prohibits an attorney from making “a
false statement of material fact or law to a third person” and
failing “to disclose a material fact [to a third person] when
105
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Informal Op. 1484 (1981); see also ABA
Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 92-363 (1992).
106
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Informal Op. 1484 (1981).
107
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 92-363 (1992).
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
111
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
112
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disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent
act by a client . . . .”113 Lastly, Model Rule 3.1 prohibits an
attorney from bringing a meritless claim.114
According to the ABA, DR 7-105(A) acted “as a total
prohibition regardless of the merits of the threatened action or
the aim of the lawyer in making the threat.”115 Critics argued
that the rule, read literally, was too extreme because it forbade
all threats, even “non-extortionate and reasonable” ones.116 For
instance, the threat “[r]eturn the stolen money or we will tell the
prosecutor that you possess child pornography” was obviously
extortion and aimed at coercing opposing counsel into a civil
remedy.117 By contrast, the threat “[r]eturn the stolen money or
we will report the theft to the prosecutor” merely threatened
actions reasonable in the circumstances.118 Yet DR 7-105(A),
read literally, forbade both types of threats.119
The conceptual reach of DR 7-105(A), moreover, was
arguably unclear. As a result, “courts struggled with definitional
questions of lawyers’ appropriate ethical conduct with respect to
the treatment of threats of criminal action.”120 Interpretations of
Some
“threaten” and “solely” became contested issues.121
jurisdictions distinguished “threatening” from “notifying,”
“informing,” or “warning” others that lawyers’ behavior may be
criminal.122 Other jurisdictions considered “the existence of an
actual intent to report violations significant to whether the
lawyer’s sole purpose in making the threat is improper.”123
“Interpreting ‘solely’ [was] problematic” since it was a fact
specific and “subjective inquiry into the true intent of the
lawyer[’s] . . . threat.”124 This allowed one lawyer to threaten
another with criminal prosecution so long as an “ ‘imminently

113
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plausible alternative explanation’ for threatening prosecution,”
existed.125
Ultimately, courts found attorneys “disserv[ing]” their client
when they abided by DR 7-105(A), and thus found the rule
“unworkable.”126 The West Virginia Supreme Court held an
attorney who sent opposing counsel a “ ‘demand’ letter,” which
insisted that the opposing party either repay embezzled money or
face criminal prosecution, was merely engaged in “legitimate
negotiations.”127 Although West Virginia no longer followed DR
7-105(A), the court nevertheless found it useful to examine
whether the respondent had violated the then-defunct ethical
rule.128 The court relied on secondary material that examined
why the ABA had omitted DR 7-105(A).129 The secondary
material called the rule “overbroad because [it] prohibit[ed]
legitimate pressure tactics and negotiations strategies,” thus,
creating “counterproductive” situations from attorneys who
avoided negotiations out of fear of breaking the rule.130
The ABA acknowledged similar problems in Formal
Opinions 92-363 (1992) and 94-383 (1994).131 DR 7-105(A), it
reasoned, might make it improper for an attorney to threaten an
action otherwise lawful, such as filing criminal or disciplinary
charges when an adequate legal and factual basis exists, to
pressure an opposing party to settle a civil case on favorable
terms.132 It concluded that “the propriety of such a threat turns
on whether the threatened proceeding provides an alternative
means of vindicating the rights at issue in the civil case or
whether the lawyer is threatening unrelated harm in order to
obtain leverage or a bargaining chip for settlement.”133 Like the
West Virginia Supreme Court, the ABA acknowledged that it was
possible for an attorney to make a threat reasonably and not to
simply extort opposing counsel, notwithstanding the literal
language of DR 7-105(A).134
125
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In addition, courts struggled with the rule. In People v.
Farrant, the court ruled that an attorney made an impermissible
threat of criminal prosecution to his client when the attorney
provided his client with a letter he would send to the bankruptcy
court if the client did not withdraw her objection to paying his
fees.135 The attorney attempted to deny making any threat,
stating in his letter, “I don’t send you this letter by any means as
an extorsive device for my fees.”136 The court nevertheless
concluded that the attorney had violated DR 7-105(A).137
However, in In re Conduct of McCurdy, the court ruled that
an attorney did not violate DR 7-105(A) when he sent a letter to
an accused hit and run driver on his client’s behalf, stating that
the client would not file charges if the driver paid for the damage
to the client’s car.138 The court emphasized “that DR 7-105(A)
requires evidence of specific intent to threaten to present
criminal charges to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.”139 The
attorney testified that he did not threaten criminal penalties in
his letter to the driver, but instead alleged “reasonable efforts” to
resolve the matter without filing suit.140 The court was not
convinced that the attorney had “threatened to present criminal
charges to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.”141
In Decato’s Case, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
considered a case of an attorney who had sent a letter demanding
that the recipient make payment after placing a hold on his
check.142 The letter mentioned the crime of obtaining services by
deception to avoid payment and that the attorney “shall consider
filing a criminal complaint,” if not fully paid.143 The court ruled
“[t]he mere mention of possibly filing criminal charges does not
in itself suggest that the statement was made in an effort to gain
leverage in a collection suit.”144 The court declined to find that
the attorney’s sole purpose in sending the letter was to obtain an
advantage in a civil matter.145
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In sum, the drafters of the Model Rules deliberately omitted
DR 7-105(A) because of their view that other Model Rules, such
as Rules 8.4 and 4.4, generally prohibited threats and the type of
conduct DR 7-105(A) aimed to protect against; thus, the drafters
believed there was no need to prohibit threats specifically.146
Also, the drafters felt, “no general prohibition on threats of
prosecution [was] justified” because the “prohibition would be
overbroad, excessively restricting a lawyer from carrying out his
or her responsibility to ‘zealously’ assert the client’s position
under the adversary system.”147 Moreover, the drafters believed
that regardless of whether threats of criminal prosecution violate
the ethical rules, such conduct may constitute violations of
criminal statutes, like blackmail, extortion, and coercion.148
Therefore, the ABA determined that “extortionate,
fraudulent, or otherwise abusive threats were covered by other,
more general prohibitions in the Model Rules,” meaning the
express prohibition in DR 7-105(A) was no longer necessary.149
Furthermore,
the ABA held that a lawyer’s threat to file a disciplinary
complaint against his adversary to gain an advantage in a civil
case would violate the Model Rules if: the adversary’s conduct
required reporting; the misconduct was unrelated to the civil
matter; the disciplinary charges are not well-founded in fact or
law[;] or the threat is designed solely to harass.150

Thus, the Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
determined that:
[t]he Model Rules do not prohibit a lawyer from using the
possibility of presenting criminal charges against the opposing
party in a private civil matter to gain relief for a client, provided
that the criminal matter is related to the client’s civil claim, the
lawyer has a well-founded belief that both the civil claim and
the criminal charges are warranted by the law and the facts,
and the lawyer does not attempt to exert or suggest improper
influence over the criminal process.151
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Additionally,
[t]he Model Rules do not prohibit a lawyer from agreeing, or
having the lawyer’s client agree, in return for satisfaction of the
client’s civil claim, to refrain from presenting criminal charges
against the opposing party as part of a settlement agreement,
provided that such agreement does not violate applicable law.152

Furthermore, it is not unethical “for attorneys to mention
the possibility of criminal charges during civil suit negotiations,
so long as they do ‘not attempt to exert or suggest improper
influence over the criminal process.’ ”153
B.

State Approaches to the Issue

While the drafters of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct intentionally omitted DR 7-105(A) of the ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility in 1983, various states
continue to prohibit threats of presenting criminal charges to
settle a lawsuit.154 Specifically, some states adopted counterparts
to DR 7-105(A) and expressly prohibited the conduct outlined in
the now-defunct ABA rule.155 Other states adopted variations of
DR 7-105(A) and expanded on the category of prohibited threats
to include administrative and disciplinary charges.156 Yet, other
152
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states adopted the ABA’s reasoning for omitting DR 7-105(A)
from its ethical guidelines and eliminated any equivalent of that
rule in their disciplinary codes.157
1.

States Containing Express Provisions

Several states expressly prohibit threats to present criminal
charges to settle lawsuits. Specifically, Alabama, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, New Jersey, New York, Oregon,
Tennessee, and Vermont adopted DR 7-105(A).158 For instance,
New York has adopted the precise language of DR 7-105(A) in its
Rules of Professional Conduct (“NYRPC”) 3.4(e).159 The rule
states, “[a] lawyer shall not: . . . present, participate in
presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges solely to
obtain an advantage in a civil matter.”160 Like the ABA’s Model
Code, NYRPC 3.4(e) does not prohibit threats of filing complaints
with administrative agencies or disciplinary authorities; the
plain language of the rule expressly limits the prohibited threats
to “criminal charges.”161 Read literally, therefore, the rule in
such states differs from the rule in states that include
“administrative or disciplinary charges” in their counterparts to
DR 7-105(A).162
Nevertheless, the New York Bar Committee has cautioned
that “[g]iven the opportunities for abuse . . . the right to threaten
a disciplinary grievance is subject to important limitations.”163
The Committee believes that several rules in New York’s Rule of
Professional Conduct provide such limitations, such as Rules
3.4(a)(6) (concerning knowledge of engagement in illegal
conduct), 4.1 (concerning truthfulness in statements to others),
(2016); S.C. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.5 (2005); TEX. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r.
4.04(b) (1990); VA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.4(i) (2020).
157
See infra Part III.B.2.
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See, e.g., ALA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.10 (1994); CONN. RULES OF PRO.
CONDUCT r. 3.4(7) (2019); FLA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4-3.4(g) (2014); GA.
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.4(h) (2011); HAW. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.4(i)
(2014); IDAHO RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.4(a)(3)-(4) (2019); N.J. RULES OF PRO.
CONDUCT r. 3.4(g) (1984) (amended 1990); N.Y. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.4(e)
(2009); OR. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.4(g) (2005); TENN. RULE OF PRO. CONDUCT
r. 4.4(a)(2) (2011) (amended 2017); VT. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.5 (2009).
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N.Y. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.4(e) (2020).
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Ass’n Comm. on Pro. Ethics, Formal Op. 2017-3 (2017).
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4.4(a) (concerning conduct with no substantial purpose other
than to cause embarrassment or harm), and 8.4(b)-(d), (h)
(concerning illegal conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s
honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness and conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice).164
Other states have expanded DR 7-105(A)’s scope to also
include other types of threats. Specifically, the District of
Columbia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Ohio, South
Carolina, Texas, and Virginia also prohibit threats of disciplinary
charges.165 For example, Kentucky and Massachusetts Rules of
Professional Conduct 3.130(3.4)(f) and 3.4(h), respectively,
provide that a lawyer shall not “present, participate in
presenting, or threaten to present criminal or disciplinary
charges solely to obtain an advantage in any civil or criminal
matter.”166
California, Colorado, and Maine have even broader
provisions that prohibit threats to present criminal,
For instance,
administrative, and disciplinary charges.167
California’s Rules of Professional Conduct 3.10(a) states that: “A
lawyer shall not threaten to present criminal, administrative, or
disciplinary charges to obtain an advantage in a civil dispute.”168
“ ‘[A]dministrative charges’ ” are defined liberally as “filing or
lodging of a complaint with any governmental organization that
may order or recommend the loss or suspension of a license, or
may impose or recommend the imposition of a fine, pecuniary
sanction, or other sanction of a quasi-criminal nature.”169 The

164
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See, e.g., D.C. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2007); KY. RULES OF PRO.
CONDUCT r. 3.130(3.4)(f) (2014); LA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2004); MASS.
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.4(h) (2015); OHIO RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.2(e)
(2016); S.C. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.5 (2005); TEX. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCt r.
4.04(b) (1990); VA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.4(i) (2004).
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KY. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.130(3.4)(f) (2013) (emphasis added); see
also MASS. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.4(h) (2015).
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See, e.g., CAL. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.10 (2018); COLO. RULES OF PRO.
CONDUCT r. 4.5(a) (2018); ME. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.1(b) (2012); but see Colo. Bar
Ass’n Ethics Comm., Abstracts of Responses to Letter Inquiries 96/97-18 (1996–97),
http://cobar.org/For-Members/Committees/Ethics-Committee/Abstracts-of-Responses-toLetter-Inquiries/1996-1997-Archive-Letter-Abracts#18
[https://perma.cc/SQ9V-AC8U]
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term “threat” is also broadly defined; it need not be stated
expressly, but can be “inferred from the circumstances.”170
States that have decided to retain the substance of DR 7105(A) have done so because they deemed it important to have a
clear rule forbidding the conduct in question, notwithstanding
the ABA’s decision to omit the rule.171 For example, the District
of Columbia decided to retain the provision because “[t]he
problem dealt with . . . is not specifically addressed by any other
provision in the proposed Rules” and “the conduct
prohibited . . . which is tantamount to common law blackmail,
was serious enough, and its occurrence frequent enough, that a
rule clearly forbidding that conduct was needed.”172
Similarly, when the California State Bar Committee
redrafted its Rules of Professional Conduct in 2018, it
acknowledged that “[a]lthough there are criminal laws regarding
extortion that prohibit such conduct, it is important to have a
disciplinary rule that prohibits the conduct and puts lawyers on
notice that they are subject to discipline for making such
threats.”173
This committee viewed California Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.10 as “the most direct approach to
preventing [the conduct and] . . . there is no evidence there has
been a problem with it and removing this longstanding rule
might suggest to some readers that these threats now are to be
permitted.”174 Consistent with this view, when the California
State Bar adopted its new comprehensive set of Professional
Rules, it aimed at “ensur[ing] that the proposed rules set forth a
clear and enforceable articulation of disciplinary standards, as
opposed to purely aspirational objectives.”175 Additionally, the
commission in charge of developing these rules was tasked with
“consider[ing] the historical purpose of the Rules of Professional

170
Jason D. Kogan, Be Careful What You Threaten, CAL. BAR J. (Dec. 2003),
http://archive.calbar.ca.gov/archive/Archive.aspx?articleId=53542&categoryId=53522
&month=12&year=2003 [https://perma.cc/QZR9-DBBE].
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See, e.g., N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Pro. Ethics, Formal Op. 2017-3 (2017).
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D.C. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 220 n.1 (1991).
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CAL. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.10 exec. summary (Proposed Draft 2016),
https://www.calbar.ca.gov/portals/0/documents/rules/rrc2014/final_rules/rrc23.10_[5-100]-all.pdf [https://perma.cc/RT66-5XJX].
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Justice Lee Edmon, Help the State Bar Revise the Rules of Professional Conduct
(June 27, 2019), http://www.calbarjournal.com/May2015/Opinion/JusticeLeeEdmon.aspx
[https://perma.cc/2PCK-BDGB].
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Conduct in California . . . and focus on revisions that . . . are
necessary to address changes in law. . . .”176
2.

States Omitting Express Provisions

In deciding to omit the provision, many states adopted the
ABA’s rationale for omitting DR 7-105 from the Model Rules.177
As has been noted, the Model Rule’s “omission of DR 7105(A) . . . rested on the drafters’ [belief] that extorti[ve],
fraudulent, or otherwise abusive threats were [already] covered
by other, more general prohibitions in the Model Rules.”178
Additionally, the drafters also thought that the rule was
overbroad, forbidding “threats that were non-extortionate and
reasonable.”179 Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland,
Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, and Utah explicitly
acknowledged this line of reasoning in their state bar ethics
opinions.180 The Alaska Bar Association Ethics Committee, for
example, agreed with the ABA’s logic and found that “other
provisions within the Ethical Rules adequately address potential
unethical conduct.”181 Additionally, the committee believed that
ABA Formal Opinion No. 92-363 provided “clearer guidelines for
practitioners and is more consistent with an attorney’s
obligations to zealously assert a client’s position.”182
Nevertheless, like the Model Rules, these states continue to
prohibit threats that involve extortion, fraud, or otherwise
abusive conduct.183 Rather than prohibiting the conduct through
an explicit rule, these states rely on a framework of rules that
indirectly proscribe such conduct. For instance, the North
176
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Carolina Bar emphasized that extortionate threats “would at a
minimum violate” Rule 4.4, which governs the respect for rights
of third persons, and Rule 8.4, which governs misconduct.184
Similarly, Utah indicated that “extortionate” threats are
“impermissible,” since “extortion is a ‘crime that reflects
adversely on a lawyer’s honesty.’ ”185 Further, Arizona indicated
that extortion might also implicate conduct that is “prejudicial to
the administration of justice.”186 In essence, states rely on other
professional rules to prohibit the abusive conduct that DR 7105(A) once expressly prohibited.
These states have also established stringent requirements
for presenting charges in suits. The ABA has indicated that:
a threat to bring criminal charges for the purpose of advancing
a civil claim would violate the Model Rules if the criminal
wrongdoing were unrelated to the client’s civil claim, if the
lawyer did not believe both the civil claim and the potential
criminal charges to be well-founded, or if the threat constituted
an attempt to exert or suggest improper influence over the
criminal process.187

States that chose to omit DR 7-105 have followed these ABA
guidelines. For example, North Carolina mandates that “a
threat to present criminal charges or the presentation of criminal
charges may only be made if the lawyer reasonably believes that
both the civil claim and the criminal charges are well-grounded
in fact and warranted by law and the client’s objective is not
wrongful.”188 Likewise, under the Alaska Ethical Rules, it is not
unethical for a lawyer to use the possibility of presenting
criminal charges,
provided that the criminal matter is related to the client’s civil
claim, the lawyer has well-founded belief that both the civil
claim and the criminal charges are warranted by the law and
the facts, and the lawyer does not attempt to exert or suggest
improper influence over the criminal process.189
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IV. THE ABA SHOULD ADOPT RULES SPECIFIC TO PROFESSIONAL
MALFEASANCE
The ABA’s struggles with DR 7-105(A) suggest that a
general rule prohibiting threats of criminal or disciplinary
prosecution may be overbroad. In the ordinary bilateral dispute,
both civil and criminal remedies are often available.190 The
wronged party should have the freedom to select the most
effective course of action to achieve redress. There is no
overarching requirement in our law that all crimes must be
prosecuted, regardless of whether the parties have already
reconciled.
The same is not true when the wrongdoing involved has
externalities—where, if not subject to regulatory oversight, the
wrongdoing has the potential to threaten the safety or well-being
of the public. Legislatures have already declared public policy in
this context by, among other things, establishing oversight
boards to supervise the regulated professions.191 They have
argued that the ordinary palette of civil and criminal remedies is
not sufficient to prevent serious public harms.192
Allowing attorneys to agree to undermine the work of those
oversight boards by agreeing to suppress evidence of professional
malfeasance in exchange for financial reward is unnecessary,
unseemly, and in the nontechnical sense unethical. It calls into
question the integrity of the profession as a whole. Allowing
attorneys to threaten not to suppress such evidence unless the
malefactor makes payment is no better.
The ABA Model Rules should include provisions that
prohibit attorneys from undertaking such actions. Specifically,
the Model Rules should adopt a provision like CRPC 5.6(b), but
covering professional malfeasance generally: “A lawyer shall not
participate in offering or making an agreement which precludes
the reporting of a violation of these rules” or of any other
professional malfeasance by a member of a regulated
profession.193 The ultimate aim of including such a provision is to
190
See, e.g., David L. Goldberg, Civil Remedies for Criminal Conduct:
Representing the Crime Victim, 30 LITIG. 32, 32−36 (2004).
191
See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230-c (McKinney 2020).
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See James Bessen, Everything You Need to Know About Occupational Licensing,
VOX (Nov. 18, 2014, 10:26 AM), https://www.vox.com/2014/11/18/18089272/occupationallicensing [https://perma.cc/F2WZ-BBEU] (emphasizing licensing boards are needed “to
make sure that service providers meet minimum standards of quality and safety” in
order to prevent serious public harms).
193
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ensure that attorneys are barred from agreeing to undermine
oversight of the regulated professions for financial gain and
thereby subverting the purposes of states’ professional regulatory
systems.
Today, in the absence of such an explicit rule,
malpractice plaintiffs regularly preclude themselves from
reporting serious violations for the sake of bigger payouts.194
Meanwhile, the public is never informed of a professional’s
misconduct, the relevant regulatory oversight board is not
alerted of the need to take remedial action to prevent the
professional in question from harming future clients, and
potential clients or patients who search the oversight board’s
records to confirm the quality of the services they seek to
purchase are misled by the regulatory system’s records
themselves.
Similarly, the ABA should adopt a rule narrower than DR 7105(A) to prohibit threats of disciplinary action to gain an
advantage in civil settings. Specifically, the Model Rules should
adopt a provision analogous to, but narrower than, DR 7-105(A):
“A lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or
threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an
advantage in a civil matter.”195
The ABA’s reasoning for omitting DR 7-105(A) is
inapplicable in the professional disciplinary context. First, the
ABA justified the omission because extortion laws and other
provisions in the Model Rules address any abusive action.196
However, extortion laws are overly broad and are unlikely to
have the same deterrent functions as an explicit provision in the
Model Rules, the attorney standards of professional conduct, and
none of the provisions cited by the ABA explicitly proscribe
making threats. Second, the ABA’s concern that DR 7-105(A)
prohibited legitimate threats is inapplicable in the professional
regulatory context.197 With respect to attorney malfeasance, ABA
Model Rule 8.3 already requires that lawyers report legal
malpractice to “the appropriate professional authority.”198 A
threat to make such a report unless the offending party makes a
payment
is
arguably
inconsistent
with
that
rule.
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Notwithstanding this inconsistency, one suspects that Model
Rule 8.3 is honored in the breach in the settlement of legal
malpractice actions, in part because of the ABA’s well-publicized
ambivalence regarding the ethical status of threats and in part
because of the lucrative consequences of such threats. Third, the
ABA reasoned that DR 7-105(A) disserved client interests.199
While this may be true, failure to report professional
malfeasance creates serious externalities that cannot and should
not be ignored. It is not the case that only the wronged client or
patient has an interest in professional malfeasance. If it were,
there would be no need for professional regulatory bodies.
Professional malfeasance is a context in which client interests
must be balanced with the countervailing interests of the
public—just as state legislatures have concluded is true in the
case of confidential settlements of sexual harassment and
product liability cases.200 In addition, notwithstanding the ABA’s
decision to delete DR 7-105(A), a majority of states have kept the
rule. The majority has recognized the need to retain a black
letter rule that clearly proscribes making threats to gain an
advantage because the problem is perceived to be serious and
common. The ABA is now out of step with practice; it has left the
path to forge its own way, but only a minority of states have
followed.
Ultimately, the provisions for which the Article advocates
would limit a party’s ability to suppress evidence of professional
malfeasance through the use of confidential settlement
agreements. The product liability and sexual harassment cases
demonstrate the harmful consequences of permitting parties to
use the promise of silence to exact larger settlement payouts.
Under the current ABA Model Rules, professionals routinely
remain unreported to the state regulatory authorities established
for their supervision and oversight. The Model Rules are thereby
being used to subvert those regulatory regimes. Professionals
who have violated applicable regulatory standards are thereby
permitted to continue to freely harm others. And lawyers and
the ABA are at least arguably complicit in the resulting harms.
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With the assistance of plaintiffs’ attorneys, car
manufacturers have continued to sell defective cars that resulted
in hundreds of deaths.
With the assistance of plaintiffs’
attorneys, sexual predators have continued to sexually abuse
others, often victim after victim.
With the assistance of
plaintiffs’ attorneys, lawyers have continued to steal money from
client after client to pay for their settlements. The provisions
recommended here would constitute a major step forward to
prevent these dangers and protect the public in the professional
regulatory context.
CONCLUSION
The appropriateness of confidentiality provisions in
settlement agreements has been widely contested. This Article
takes no position on confidentiality provisions in general.
Rather, it focuses on confidentiality provisions that undermine
the operation of state professional regulatory systems. The
problem is acute in the context of attorney oversight by bar
overseers. Even today, notwithstanding Model Rule 8.3, legal
malpractice claims are settled, and as a condition of that
settlement, plaintiffs and their attorneys agree not to report the
underlying conduct to the state bar. This common scenario
undermines the state bar’s authority to regulate and ultimately
deter attorneys from violating professional rules of conduct and
accurately to inform the public of specific attorneys’ ethical
histories. The same is true in the context of other professional
regulatory regimes. Rules that prevent parties from agreeing to
refrain from reporting professional malfeasance to the relevant
regulatory authority or from making threats to making such
reports to gain an advantage in civil settings are necessary.

